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Abstract. Testing-based methodologies like fuzzing are able to analyze complex
software which is not amenable to traditional formal approaches like verica-
tion, model checking, and abstract interpretation. Despite enormous success at
exposing countless security vulnerabilities in many popular software projects,
applications of testing-based approaches have mainly targeted checking tradi-
tional safety properties like memory safety. While unquestionably important,
this class of properties does not precisely characterize other important security
aspects such as information leakage, e.g., through side channels.
In this work we extend testing-based software analysis methodologies to two-
safety properties, which enables the precise discovery of information leaks in
complex software. In particular, we present the ct-fuzz tool, which lends coverage-
guided greybox fuzzers the ability to detect two-safety property violations. Our
approach is capable of exposing violations to any two-safety property expressed
as equality between two program traces. Empirically, we demonstrate that ct-fuzz
swiftly reveals timing leaks in popular cryptographic implementations.
1 Introduction
Security is a primary concern for software systems. Programming errors like out-of-
bounds memory accesses and inexhaustive input validation are responsible for danger-
ous and costly incidents. Accordingly, many mechanisms exist for protecting systems
against common vulnerabilities like memory-safety errors and input injection. Among
the most eective automated approaches is coverage-based greybox fuzzing [10, 9]
popularized by the American Fuzzy Lop (afl) fuzzer [48], which has uncovered copious
critical vulnerabilities in the core software libraries underlying a vast swath of soft-
ware systems. Its ecacy is largely due to broad applicability and direct feedback: afl
employs a genetic input-generation algorithm using only lightweight instrumentation-
based monitoring to determine concrete vulnerability-witnessing inputs. Importantly, it
works without user interaction and even source code, and sidesteps the computational
and methodological bottlenecks imposed by traditional program analysis techniques.
Fuzzers like a-fuzz [48] target traditional temporal safety properties [22], i.e., prop-
erties concerning individual system executions. Important security aspects like secure
information ow [30] are two-safety properties [37], i.e., properties concerning pairs of
executions, and cannot be precisely characterized as traditional safety properties [24].
Secure information ow is particularly insidious given the potential for side channels,
through which adversaries may infer privileged information about the data accessed by
a program, e.g., by correlating execution-time dierences with control-ow dierences.
Side-channels are dicult for programmers to reason about since they are generally
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hardware-dependent. Furthermore, while compiler optimizations are obliged to respect
traditional safety properties, they are not designed to respect two-safety properties, and
can thus generate insecure machine code which otherwise would be secure without
compiler optimizations.
In this work we extend fuzzing to two-safety properties. In particular, we present
ct-fuzz,3 which enables the precise discovery of timing-based information leaks while
retaining the ecacy of a-fuzz [48]. Via self-composition [7], we reduce testing two-
safety properties to testing traditional safety properties by program transformation,
eectively enabling the application of any fuzzer. Our implementation tackles three
basic challenges. First, the program under test must eciently simulate execution-pairs
of the original; to avoid overhead, each execution’s address space is copy-on-write
shared. Second, structured input-pairs must be derived from random fuzzer-provided
input; leaks are only witnessed when inputs dier solely by secret content. Third,
leakage-inducing actions must be monitored; leaks are witnessed when, e.g., control
ow or memory-access traces diverge, given inputs diering solely by secret content.
Our implementation focuses on timing leaks related to program control-ow and
cpu cache; the name ct-fuzz refers to the constant-time property, asserting that the
control-ow and accessed memory locations of two executions diering solely by
secrets are identical. Besides constant-time, we also apply ct-fuzz to ner-grained cache
models to validate secure yet non-constant-time programs which ensure identical cache
timing despite potentially-divergent memory-access patterns, e.g., by preloading all
accessed memory into the cache. While our implementation focuses on side-channel
leakage related to timing, it is extensible to other forms of leakage, e.g., power or
electro-magnetic radiation, by further extending the instrumentation mechanism to
record other aspects of program behavior. In principle, ct-fuzz could be extended to
expose violations to any two-safety property expressible as equality between two
program traces.
In the remainder we describe several aspects of the ct-fuzz tool. Sections 2 and 3
cover foundations and implementation concerns in testing two-safety properties. Sec-
tions 4 and 5 cover ct-fuzz’s software architecture and basic functionality. Sections 6
and 7 describe case studies and evaluation, demonstrating the eective application of
ct-fuzz to many cryptographic libraries. We survey related and potential future work
in Sections 8 and 9.
2 Theoretical Foundations
In this section we characterize ct-fuzz’s foundations, including secure information ow,
its reduction to traditional safety properties, and coverage-guided greybox fuzzing.
2.1 Secure Information Flow
We consider an abstract notion of secure information ow [30] over pairs of executions.
We say two executions e1 and e2 are f -equivalent with respect to some function
f when f(e1) = f(e2). We model program secrets by a declassication function D
mapping each execution e to its declassied content D(e), and say D-equivalent
3 ct-fuzz: the fuzzer for constant time. https://github.com/michael-emmi/ct-fuzz
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generate inputs and report crashes.
executions are comparable.4 Intuitively, this equivalence relates executions whose
input and output values dier solely by secret con ent, e.g., by the value of a secret
key. Similarly, we model attacker capabilities by an observation function O mapping
each execution e to its observable content O(e), and say two O-equivalent executions
are indistinguishable. Intuitively, this equivalence relates executions which a given
observer cannot dierentiate, e.g., because of negligible timing dierences. In practice,
we distinguish timing variations by observing divergences in control-ow decisions
and accessed memory locations.
Denition 1. A program is secure when every pair of comparable executions are indis-
tinguishable, for given declassication and observation functions.
2.2 Reducing Security to Safety
Self-composition [7] is program transformation reducing secure information ow to
traditional safety properties. Here we say a given program is safe when it cannot crash.
This simple notion of safety can capture violations to any temporal safety property [22]
given adequate program instrumentation. For instance, llvm’s thread, address, and
memory sanitizers signal crashes upon thread- and memory-safety violations, and uses
of uninitialized memory, respectively [33, 32, 34].
The self-composition is a program (Fig. 1), which executes two copies of a given
program in isolation, i.e., execution of each copy is independent of the other, which:
– halts execution when the copies’ executions are incomparable, and
– crashes when the copies’ executions are both comparable and distinguishable.
Intuitively, safety of the self-composition implies security of the original program.
Conversely, if the original is safe and secure, then the self-composition is also safe.
Theorem 1. A safe program is secure iff its self-composition is safe [7].
4 This notion of declassication is more general than that appearing in the literature [30].
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2.3 Coverage-Guided Greybox Fuzzing
Böhme et al. [10, 9] provide a conceptual overview of coverage-guided greybox fuzzing
as implemented by a-fuzz [48]. For our purposes, a simplistic view (Fig. 2) suces:
fuzzers explore sequences of program executions to expose safety-property violations
(manifested as crashes — see §2.2) by randomly mutating the inputs to previously-
explored executions according to per-execution feedback. Intuitively, feedback allows
the fuzzer to navigate alternate program paths, and in practice, captures basic-blocks
transition counts. From the perspective of this work, the salient aspects of a-fuzz
are its broad applicability and eciency: it works without user interaction and source
code, and avoids prohibitive process-creation overheads by sharing executions’ address
spaces in a copy-on-write fashion. These features enable the rapid exploration of
program executions for arbitrarily-complex software.
3 Design and Implementation Concerns
Applying self-composition (§2.2) to coverage-guided greybox fuzzers (§2.3) poses three
basic challenges: eciently simulating execution pairs; deriving structured-input pairs
from fuzzer-provided inputs (fuzz); and detecting leakage.
3.1 Simulating Execution Pairs
The self-composition approach (§2.2) dictates that two identical copies of a program
execute in isolation. In the context of testing, achieving isolation includes separating the
address spaces of each simulated execution so that the side-eects of one are invisible
to the other. On the one hand, the existing approach of duplicating procedures and
variables is eective for symbolic analyses like ct-verif [1]. However, actually executing
such duplicated programs on their target platforms can alter the originals’ behavior
signicantly, e.g., due to platform-dependent behavior. On the other hand, executing
copies in separate processes undermines the ecacy of fuzzers like a-fuzz [48], which
largely avoid the overhead of process creation.
3.2 Deriving Structured Inputs from Fuzz
According to secure information ow (§2.1), leaks are only witnessed by comparable
executions, i.e., whose declassications are identical. So on the one hand, testing
incomparable executions is wasteful. On the other hand, coverage-guided greybox
fuzzers (§2.3) provide inputs (fuzz) by randomly mutating previously-explored inputs.
A self-composition which fed fuzz directly to its simulated executions would generate
comparable executions with very low likelihood. For instance, when input variable x
is declassied in the program P (x, y), the likelihood of randomly generating the fuzz
〈x1, y1, x2, y2〉 with x1 = x2 for comparable P (x1, y1) and P (x2, y2) is extremely low
for typical datatypes, e.g., 32- and 64-bit integers. It follows that exposing information
leaks requires non-trivial transformations from fuzz to structured input pairs.
3.3 Detecting Leakage
According to secure information ow (§2.1), leaks are witnessed by comparable yet
distinguishable executions, i.e., whose declassications are identical, yet observations
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are distinct. Assuming a reliable mechanism for generating comparable executions
(§3.2), monitoring leakage amounts to establishing a notion of observation for a given
leakage model, instrumenting the source program to record such observations, and
signaling a program crash when observations dier.
4 Software Architecture
We implement self-composition by a lightweight llvm program transformation [36].
We invoke it as part of a-fuzz’s llvm-based instrumentation [48] for convenience,
before passing the instrumented program to a-fuzz. The choice of an llvm-based
implementation was made for familiarity and convenience, e.g., due to llvm bitcode
being typed; in principle, our approach could be implemented at the assembly level.
Following the concerns outlined in Section 3, our transformation provides three basic
capabilities: eciently simulating execution pairs, deriving structured inputs-pairs
from fuzz, and capturing leakage-relevant observations.
4.1 Ecient Implementation of Self-Composition
To implement self-composition, ct-fuzz borrows the same basic trick that makes a-
fuzz ecient: copy-on-write sharing of address spaces via process forks. Figure 3
sketches our implementation strategy. After initializing the data structures used to
capture observations (§4.3), constructing inputs from fuzz (§4.2), and ensuring the
preconditions of the program under test, ct-fuzz forks the running process twice. After
each child executes the original program on its copy of input, the parent checks equality
of the children’s observation traces. Section 5.1 describes the specication of programs,
including stating their declassications and preconditions.
Our fork-based self-composition avoids a potentially-complex address-space man-
agement entailed by the existing duplication approach (see §3.1). Forking the existing
process creates children with identical address spaces, thus minimizing the potential
for articial divergence. Furthermore, the cost of forking is low on modern operating
systems due to copy-on-write optimization: the virtual-memory pages of child processes
point to the same physical pages as their parents; pages themselves are only duplicated
when either the parent or child dirties them with subsequent writes. While forking
provides ample isolation for basic CPU-driven programs like cryptographic primitives,
we do not ensure isolation with stateful IO, e.g., interacting with les and sockets; this
is a common issue for testing-based approaches.
Our implementation of self-composition also assumes that library functions are
deterministic: a sequence of invocations returns identical values in both forked children.
Nondeterminism can undermine ct-fuzz’s leakage tests, since divergence between
execution pairs may be due to nondeterminism rather than dependence on secrets.
This potential is especially apparent in memory allocation: malloc is generally free to
return the address of any unallocated chunk of memory. ct-fuzz handles this common
case by linking the Jemalloc allocator [17], which ensures deterministic behavior.
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void ct_fuzz_main(void) {
int status;
ct_fuzz_initialize();
ct_fuzz_read_inputs();
// ensure preconditions
for (int id = 0; id < 2; ++id)
ct_fuzz_spec(id);
// execute each copy
for (int id = 0; id < 2; ++id) {
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == -1)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
else if (pid == 0) {
ct_fuzz_exec(id);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} else
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
}
ct_fuzz_check_observations();
}
Fig. 3. A fork-based self-composition.
// captures observations
// for branch instructions
void ct_fuzz_update_monitor_by_cond(
bool condition_value,
char* file_name,
num_t line_number,
num_t column_number
);
// captures observations
// for memory accesses
void ct_fuzz_update_monitor_by_addr(
char* address,
char* file_name,
num_t line_number,
num_t column_number
);
Fig. 4. An API for capturing observations.
4.2 Deriving Inputs from Fuzz
To transform the randomly-mutated inputs (fuzz) into program inputs which are likely
to generate comparable executions (see §3.2), ct-fuzz generates per-program input
processors. These processors depend on the signatures of entry points, as well as
declassication annotations on program arguments. Besides the program under test,
ct-fuzz expects such signatures and annotations to be specied using the API described
in Section 5. Given this specication, ct-fuzz constructs an input processor, which
constructs program-input pairs by reading (from standard input) one fuzzed instance
of each declassied argument, and two fuzzed instances of each secret argument. ct-
fuzz invokes both program copies with the same fuzz for declassied arguments, and
possibly distinct fuzz for secret arguments. While this mechanism does not guarantee
that the corresponding executions are ultimately comparable, since further declassi-
cation can occur upon execution, e.g., declassication of output values, it does avoid
incomparability due to declassied inputs.5
5 While our current implementation does not handle post-input declassication, this could be
done by monitoring declassications, similarly to monitoring observations — see §4.3.
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4.3 Recording Observations and Reporting Leakage
To capture alternate leakage models ct-fuzz provides an extensible mechanism for
recording observations. As our initial implementation targets control-ow and cache-
based timing leaks, our program transformation inserts instrumentation before branch
and memory-access instructions; more precisely, we insert calls to the monitor API
of Figure 4. The monitor receives branch-condition values and memory addresses,
along with the source location of each instruction, and records observations in a
shared memory region for access by parent process. When observations diverge, ct-
fuzz signals leakage by inducing a crash which will be reported by the fuzzer; our
current implementation causes a segmentation fault by dereferencing address zero.
Our initial prototype provides two distinct implementations of the monitor API.
The rst constant-time monitor collects traces of branch-condition values and mem-
ory addresses directly; executions are distinguishable if they dier on any of the
branch-condition values or memory addresses. The second cache-model monitor records
Boolean values indicating cache hits or misses in place of memory accesses, allowing
for the precise analysis of non-constant-time programs which are nevertheless safe
for a given cache architecture, e.g., cache-preloading implementations (see §6). Our
prototype uses Sung et al.’s cache model [35], though any could be used in its place.
To limit the size of the allocated shared-memory region and time for equality-
checking, we leverage a fast hash-function [13] to replace the storage of arbitrarily-
long observation sequences with one xed-size hash value. For each observation o, the
monitor updates its hash value m to f(o ·m) for a given hash function f . We state the
correctness of this optimization as follows, where a perfect hash function f is one in
which f(x) = f(y) iff x = y.
Theorem 2. Given a perfect hash function, two observation sequences are equal iff their
lengths and corresponding monitors are equal.
5 Functionality and Capabilities
Our ct-fuzz tool is capable of reporting timing leaks in any code base that can be
analyzed with a-fuzz’s LLVM mode. In this section we demonstrate the use of ct-fuzz
on the simple cryptographic function in Figure 5.
5.1 Specifying Argument Preconditions, Declassications, and Defaults
Our current implementation of ct-fuzz requires a brief specication of the program
under test. Specically, we require information about program arguments: precon-
ditions, declassications, and default values. Similarly to ct-verif [1], annotations in
ct-fuzz are written directly in the source language (i.e., C/C++), and processed by our
instrumentation at compile time. Specications are attached to entry points using
the CT_FUZZ_SPEC and CT_FUZZ_SEED macros. The specication in Figure 5 declassi-
es the len argument (msg is secret), requires that each byte of the msg buer be an
ascii-encoded decimal digit, and provides a default buer containing bytes ’1’–’4’.
To facilitate the fuzzing of dynamically-sized buers like msg, the specication also
declares that msg is a buer of length len at most 4 bytes; alternatively, constant-length
buers can also be specied. Default values provide the initial values (seeds) from
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// encrypt.c
const char book[10] __attribute__((aligned(64)))
= { 52, 48, 55, 51, 56, 54, 50, 49, 57, 53 };
void encrypt(char* msg, unsigned len) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < len; ++i)
msg[i] = book[msg[i]-48];
}
// ct-fuzz specification of `encrypt`
#include "ct-fuzz.h"
CT_FUZZ_SPEC(void, encrypt, char* msg, unsigned len) {
// `msg` is a buffer of length `len` at most `4`
__ct_fuzz_ptr_len(msg, len, 4);
// declassification of the `len` argument
__ct_fuzz_public_in(len);
// precondition that `msg` contains ASCII decimals
for (unsigned i = 0; i < len; ++i)
CT_FUZZ_ASSUME(msg[i]>=48 && msg[i]<=57);
}
CT_FUZZ_SEED(void, encrypt, char*, unsigned) {
SEED_1D_ARR(char, msg, 4, {'1','2','3','4'})
PRODUCE(encrypt, msg, 4);
}
Fig. 5. A simple (cryptographically-insecure) lookup-table based encryption function.
which fuzzers begin their mutation-based exploration. While their specication is not
strictly required, since fuzzers can begin with initially-empty seeds, reasonable seeds
can boost fuzzers’ performance substantially. We provide macros for specifying default
values, e.g., SEED_1D_ARR. Similarly, while preconditions are not strictly required for
fuzzing, they allow us to isolate leakage-related crashes from safety-related crashes
by assuming that the original program is safe, and thus does not crash, so long as the
preconditions are met. The provided CT_FUZZ_ASSUME macro triggers exit unless its
argument evaluates to true. This mechanism leverages the fuzzer’s ability to recognize
branches and automatically synthesize inputs which pass precondition checks.
5.2 Exposure and Diagnosis of Timing Leaks
ct-fuzz applies the self-composition described in §4 on programs with specications,
generating a binary executable and initial seed for fuzzing. The invocation of ct-fuzz:
$ ct-fuzz --entry-point=encrypt encrypt.c -o encrypt
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generates the encrypt binary and seed 0x31 0x32 0x33 0x34 0x04 0x00 0x00
0x00, according to the specication of default argument values. After copying the
generated seed to input-dir, a-fuzz can be invoked directly:6
$ afl-fuzz -i input-dir -o output-dir encrypt
which instantly reports crashes indicating timing leaks, according to the constant-
time property. This is the expected result, since the memory locations accessed by the
encrypt function depend on the secret contents of msg. Specically, secrets are used as
osets into the book buer. In principle, such secret-dependent memory accesses can
lead to cache-based timing variations, and ultimately the leakage of msg contents.
To facilitate diagnostics, ct-fuzz includes a mechanism for logging and comparing
the observations of the comparable yet distinguishable execution pairs, tracing obser-
vations and the source-le locations at which they occur. For example, comparing the
traces generated for the leak exposed above:
[dbg] [0] [encrypt.c: 7, 14] [address, 403389]
...
[dbg] [1] [encrypt.c: 7, 14] [address, 403381]
we spot the divergence due to the dereference of the book buer on Line 7, column 14.
5.3 Using Alternative Leakage Models
For some applications, the constant-time leakage model is too conservative. For example,
since the book buer in Fig 5 ts into a single cache line (assuming standard modern
architectures), it would be unlikely that the secret contents of msg aect timing, since
every access to book after the rst will hit the cache, independently of msg. Alternate
leakage models can be selected in ct-fuzz with the --memory-leakage ag; currently we
support two options: address and cache. The latter implements Sung et al.’s model [35]
with xed values for block size, set associativity, and replacement policy. Extension to
parametric and alternative models is straightforward. Using the cache model, we do
not discover any timing leaks in the example above.
6 Experience and Case Studies
We have applied ct-fuzz to several popular cryptographic implementations — see §7 for
empirical results. To highlight an interesting example, we consider the AES encryption
functions of the Botan library invoked in Figure 6. For simplicity, we consider potential
leakage of a secret 16-byte key argument, xing all other parameters.
6.1 Analysis of Constant-Time
Applying ct-fuzz immediately reveals a constant-time violation, witnessed by a pair of
inputs diering only by their rst byte: 0xaa versus 0x2a. Comparing their execution
traces reveals leakage from the SE_word function shown in Figure 7: the single-byte
input dierence leads to dierent osets into the SE table computed by get_byte(3,x).
6 Currently we require manual duplication of the seed for the self-composition’s input pair.
9
#include <botan/block_cipher.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "ct-fuzz.h"
extern "C" {
void aes_wrapper(uint8_t* key) {
uint8_t out[64];
uint8_t data[64] = { 0 };
std::unique_ptr<Botan::BlockCipher> cipher(
Botan::BlockCipher::create("AES-128"));
cipher->set_key(key, 16);
cipher->encrypt_n(data, out, 4);
}
CT_FUZZ_SPEC(void, aes_wrapper, uint8_t* key) {
__ct_fuzz_ptr_len(key, 16, 16);
}
CT_FUZZ_SEED(void, aes_wrapper, uint8_t*) {
SEED_1D_ARR(uint8_t, key, 16, {42})
PRODUCE(aes_wrapper, const_cast<uint8_t*>(key));
}
}
Fig. 6. The wrapper program of AES encryption.
6.2 Precise Cache Modeling
Although Botan’s AES implementation is not constant time, it is still considered secure
against timing leaks due to its use of cache preloading countermeasures. Specically,
every entry in its lookup tables, e.g., the SE table, is accessed before the secret-dependent
lookup-table accesses performed during encryption or decryption to ensure that all
subsequent secret-dependent accesses hit the cache. However, previous versions were
found to be insecure by SC-Eliminator’s static analyzer [44] due to missing applications
of the countermeasure in the aes_key_schedule function.7
Applying ct-fuzz to the insecure version immediately reveals a timing leak even
with the cache-model monitor. Interestingly, the inputs for the rst-reported leak are
identical to those reported in the aforementioned constant-time violation; further
analysis demonstrates the same source of leakage in Figure 7: one execution’s access
of SE[get_byte(3,x)] is a cache miss, while the other’s is a hit. The divergence can
be attributed to the fact that the addresses of the four memory accesses in Fig. 7 are
proximate for one execution, while for the other execution, the address of the fourth
7 https://github.com/randombit/botan/commit/09b3d5447d77633d4f9ad0603187ca2a0b017ebd
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inline uint32_t SE_word(uint32_t x) {
return make_uint32(
SE[get_byte(0, x)],
SE[get_byte(1, x)],
SE[get_byte(2, x)],
SE[get_byte(3, x)]);
}
Fig. 7. Secret-dependent array access in Botan AES encryption.
memory access is distant to the previous three, making them belong to dierent cache
lines. As expected, reapplying ct-fuzz to the secure version reveals no timing leaks.
7 Empirical Evaluation
We evaluate ct-fuzz’s ability to uncover timing leaks in a range of cryptographic
implementations summarized by Table 1. We analyze multiple entry points from each
with the constant-time and cache-model monitors described in Section 4. Besides the
benchmarks used to evaluate SC-Eliminator [44], we have collected several libraries
from their sources. Tables 2 and 3 summarize our results.8 For each entry point, we run
a-fuzz 10 times with 10 second timeouts. In cases where a-fuzz reports crashes, we
re-run a-fuzz 100 times with the same 10 second timeout, and report the mean and
standard deviations until crash for: time (in seconds), number of explored executions,
and number of program paths explored. Otherwise, we re-run a-fuzz 2 times with a
100 second time limit, and report the execution and path counts until timeout.
7.1 Analysis with the Constant-Time Monitor
ct-fuzz swiftly reports constant-time violations due to secret-dependent table lookups,
e.g., all of Wu et al.’s benchmarks. OpenSSL’s C implementation of AES encryption
leverages substitution boxes. For supposedly constant-time implementations such
as BearSSL’s constant-time AES encryption (aes_ct) and libsodium’s constant-time
utility functions (sodium_increment, sodium_is_zero), ct-fuzz reports no violations.
In our experience with these benchmarks, a-fuzz does not report any violations, even
after several hours, that are not reported within a few seconds. On average, ct-fuzz
uncovers violations within half of a second, exploring only hundreds of executions.
Execution counts are approximate, since a-fuzz’s AFL_BENCH_UNTIL_CRASH mode
only guarantees termination soon after the rst crash. Furthermore, path counts report
the number of unique non-crashing control-ow paths discovered by a-fuzz; paths are
often unique since cryptographic implementations tend to use fairly straight-line code.
7.2 Analysis with the Cache-Model Monitor
We further run ct-fuzz with our cache-model monitor (see § 5.3). The cache model is
identical to that used in the evaluation of SC-Eliminator [44]: a fully associative LRU
8 We experiment on a 3.5GHz Intel i7 Ubuntu 16.04 desktop machine with 16GB DDR3 memory.
11
Implementations taken from original sources
BearSSL v0.5: an implementation of the SSL/TLS protocol (RFC 5246) written in C.
https://bearssl.org
libsodium @973cdb5: a modern, easy-to-use software library for encryption, decryption,
signatures, password hashing and more. https://download.libsodium.org/doc
OpenSSL v1.1.0h: a robust, commercial-grade, and full-featured toolkit for the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols. https://www.openssl.org
poly1305-donna @e6ad6e0: a state-of-the-art message-authentication code.
https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
poly1305-opt @700d5cf: a portable, performant implementation of Poly1305.
https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-opt
s2n @745fdd8: a C99 implementation of the TLS/SSL protocols that is designed to be simple,
small, fast, and with security as a priority. https://github.com/awslabs/s2n
Implementations sourced from Wu et al. [44]
Applied Crypto: textbook implementations from Applied Cryptography: protocols, algorithms,
and source code in C [31].
ChronOS: Cryptographic primitives in ChronOS linux. http://www.chronoslinux.org
FELICS: lightweight block ciphers for the Internet of Things.
https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS
Libgcrypt: a general purpose cryptographic library originally based on code from GnuPG.
https://gnupg.org/software/libgcrypt/index.html
SUPERCOP: a toolkit developed by the VAMPIRE lab for measuring the performance of
cryptographic software. https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
Botan: a C++ cryptography library released under the permissive Simplied BSD license.
https://github.com/randombit/botan/
Table 1. A list of implementations analyzed with ct-fuzz.
cache of 512 64-byte lines. We report no timing leaks for Wu et al.’s FELICS bench-
marks [44] according to the cache-model monitor, which is expected since their lookup
tables are small enough to t into one cache line. This is consistent with SC-Eliminator’s
static analysis, although our notion of leakage, framed as a two-safety property, is a
more-precise characterization which avoids the potential for false positives — see §8.
Furthermore, we report no timing leaks for constant-time functions like aes_ct, which
is expected since constant-time is stricter than the absence of leakage according to a
precise cache model. The dierences in the number of executions explored until crash
compared with the constant-time monitor is due to the approximation of execution
counts: since the constant-time monitor is more ecient than the cache-model monitor,
a-fuzz squeezes in many more executions between the rst crash and termination.
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Function Time Execs Paths Time Execs Paths
Botan
aes_key 1.1±0.07 69±0.87 1±0 2.1±0.19 61±2.3 1±0
cast128 0.35±0.08 140±9.3 1±0 0.38±0.07 74±4.2 1±0
des 0.36±0.07 190±4.8 1±0 0.36±0.07 100±7.4 1±0
kasumi 0.36±0.08 170±5.1 1±0 0.37±0.07 120±7.3 1±0
seed 0.36±0.07 160±9.8 1±0 0.37±0.08 99±8.3 1±0
twofish 0.6±0.07 88±3.1 1±0 0.59±0.07 69±1.4 1±0
ChronOS
aes 0.36±0.07 160±6.5 1±0 0.58±0.07 140±6.5 1±0
anubis 0.35±0.09 170±7.4 1±0 0.58±0.08 160±17 1±0
cast5 0.77±0.08 650±36 1±0 1.5±0.22 610±43 1±0
cast6 0.36±0.07 220±21 1±0 0.36±0.09 120±14 1±0
des 0.36±0.12 210±8 1±0 0.37±0.09 130±13 1±0
des3 0.36±0.07 180±12 1±0 0.36±0.08 110±8.9 2.6±0.6
fcrypt 0.36±0.07 280±21 1±0 0.37±0.07 200±17 1±0
khazad 0.34±0.07 270±20 1±0 0.37±0.1 130±9.4 1±0
Constant Time Cache Model
Function Time Execs Paths Time Execs Paths
Applied Crypto
loki91 0.57±0.08 18±0.79 1±0 0.91±0.10 21±1.2 1±0
3way 0.35±0.07 190±3.6 1±0 0.36±0.07 150±18 1±0
FELICS
LBlock 0.36±0.07 150±5.2 1±0 – 5.4e4±890 1±0
Piccolo 0.36±0.08 130±9.6 1±0 – 4.4e4±1e3 1±0
PRESENT 0.37±0.07 140±7.6 1±0 – 4.3e4±65 1±0
TWINE 0.37±0.07 88±2.4 1±0 – 2.9e4±280 1±0
Libgcrypt
camellia 0.35±0.07 270±32 1±0 0.36±0.08 190±27 1±0
des 0.35±0.07 210±19 1±0 0.35±0.08 150±19 1±0
seed 0.34±0.07 230±40 1±0 0.37±0.07 140±22 1±0
twofish 0.37±0.07 87±4.3 1±0 0.58±0.15 53±12 1±0
SUPERCOP
aes 0.35±0.08 290±3.2 1±0 0.36±0.07 220±5.8 1±0
cast 0.35±0.07 230±6.1 1±0 0.36±0.07 100±2.8 1±0
Table 2. Analysis of Wu et al.’s benchmarks [44] with ct-fuzz. We report averages with standard
deviations until leak detection over 100 runs for: time (in seconds), executions, and paths.
8 Related Work
The literature around secure information ow is vast, and Sabelfeld and Myers oer
a compelling survey [30]. Here we highlight recent works to detecting timing side-
channel leaks with program analysis. We distinguish between symbolic approaches,
e.g., involving verication, model checking, and abstract interpretation, and concrete ap-
proaches, e.g., testing and coverage-guided greybox fuzzing, which observe executions
on programs’ target platforms. Along another axis, we dierentiate works according
to how they identify leakage, whether it be tracking the ow of data through program
values, statistical measures on the distributions of program executions, or as two-safety
properties on pairs of program executions.
8.1 Symbolic Analyses
While our work accurately detects leakage, most related works soundly establish the
absence of leaks. In contrast, our testing-based approach sacrices soundness9 for
precision and eciency, without introducing the potential for false positives or com-
putational bottlenecks due to abstract symbolic reasoning. We identify several works
based on symbolic analysis of data-ow or two-safety properties.
Flow Tracking Many recent works propose static analyses to prove secure informa-
tion ow. tis-ct [39] extends Frama-C [14] with static analysis to compute program
dependencies and infer potential leaks. VirtualCert [6] integrated a type system capable
9 While coverage-guided fuzzing is subject to false negatives, e.g., potential leakage not re-
ported, we have found that all potential leakages are swiftly reported in typical cryptographic
implementations since control- and data-ow is straightforward.
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Function Time Execs Paths Time Execs Paths
BearSSL
aes_ct(iv,data,data_len,key,key_len) – 9.4e4±3.6e3 22±0 – 9.3e4±4.4e3 30±2.8
aes_small(iv,data,data_len,key,key_len) 0.35±0.071 1.7e2±0.2 1±0 1.5±0.13 7.5e2±51 15±6.8
md5(data,len) – 1.3e5±3.9e3 2±0 – 1.3e5±2.2e3 2±0
libsodium
crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_encrypt(
c,clen,m,mlen,ad,adlen,npub,k) – 4.2e4±1.5e3 31±0 – 3.5e4±3.6e2 46±2.1
crypto_shorthash(out,in,inlen,k) – 1.3e5±5.5e3 11±0 – 1.2e5±8.8e2 13±1.4
sodium_increment(n,nlen) – 1.4e5±7.2e3 12±0 – 1.4e5±8.8e2 16±0.7
sodium_is_zero(n,nlen) – 1.4e5±3.4e3 8±0 – 1.4e5±4.4e3 12±2.1
OpenSSL
EVP_aes_128_cbc(key,data,iv) 0.36±0.08 2.5e2±7.7 1±0 0.34±0.07 2e2±1.6 1±0
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(orig_len_raw,length) – 2.8e5±5.3e3 7.5±0.7 – 2.7e5±1.1e3 8.5±0.7
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac_modulo(orig_len_raw,length) – 2.6e5±8.9e3 8.5±0.7 – 2.7e5±3.7e3 10±0
poly1305-donna
poly1305_auth(mac,m,bytes,key) – 1.3e5±1.8e3 15±0 – 1.4e5±2.8e3 24±0.7
poly1305-opt
poly1305_auth(mac,in,inlen,key) – 2.6e4±2.2e2 1±0 – 2.4e4±4.4e2 2±1.4
s2n
s2n_hmac_digest(sekrit,sekritlen,msg,msglen) – 9.3e4±8.7e2 4±0 – 8.2e4±2.5e3 4.5±0.7
Table 3. Analysis of open-source crypto implementations with ct-fuzz. Declassied inputs are
listed in boldface. We report averages with standard deviations until leak detection over 100 runs
for: time (in seconds), executions, and paths.
of tracking aliasing and information ow into the CompCert certied compiler [21].
FlowTracker [29] developed ecient static information-ow analyses based on the
single static assignment (ssa) representation rather than program dependence graphs
(pdg). Blazy et al. [8] developed context-sensitive and arithmetic-aware alias analyses
to verify constant time of C programs using the Verasco static analyzer [18]. CacheAu-
dit [16, 15] developed eective cache-aware abstract domains to prove the absence of
cache-based side channels using abstract interpretation. SC-Eliminator [44] performs
static analysis to identify or prove the absence of potential cache-timing leaks, and
synthesizes patches by replacing conditional statements and lookup-table accesses.
Other works employ satisability-based techniques. CacheD [41] uses symbolic
execution to identify potential cache-access variations as expressions over secrets.
SCInfer [49] combines type-inference and satisability modulo theories (smt) to verify
random masking of program secrets. canal [35] performs analysis-friendly program
instrumentation enabling symbolic reasoning about cache-related properties, e.g., which
accesses are cache hits. cachefix [12] uses cbmc [19] to prove the absence of leaks, or
synthesizes patches for discovered leaks.
Two-Safety Barthe et al. [7] originally proposed the self-composition program transfor-
mation to reduce the verication of two-safety properties like secure information ow
to traditional safety verication. Terauchi and Aiken [37] rened their approach with
14
a type-directed transformation to apply self-composition selectively, with a simpler
cross-product transformation [47] around low-security program fragments. Milushev et
al. [25] adapt this approach for use with the klee symbolic execution engine [11], while
ENCoVer [5] leverages Java PathFinder [40]. Phan [26] reformulates self-composition
as path equivalence for direct symbolic execution of the original program.
Almeida et al. [2] developed a self-composition based methodology for proving
constant-time of C programs using Frama-C [14]. The recently developed ct-verif [1]
and SideTrail [4] tools apply selective self-composition to verify constant-time and
time-balancing, respectively, in C-language cryptographic primitives using the smack
verier [27]. Yang et al. [46] propose lazy self-composition to apply precise reasoning
only as a fallback to coarser techniques like taint analysis. Blazer [3] proposes quotient
partitioning as an alternative, compositional reduction to traditional safety verication.
8.2 Concrete Analyses
More closely aligned with our approach are those based on observing executions
on programs’ target platforms, thus avoiding the potential for false positives and
computational bottlenecks due to abstract symbolic reasoning. While we consider
secure information ow as a two-safety property, other works are based either on
tracking data-ow or statistical analysis.
FlowTracking The key work in this space is ctgrind [20], which extends Valgrind [38]
with a taint-tracking mechanism to track whether secrets ow into accessed memory
locations. While this avoids the bottlenecks of symbolic reasoning, this approach is
susceptible to false positives, since secret-tainted observations are falsely considered
leaks when they depend also on public or declassied data values. Considering secure
information ow as a two-safety property avoids this source of false positives.
Statistics A few approaches detect timing leaks using statistical methods. dudect [28]
records the execution time of many (typically millions) of executions with inputs
partitioned into random and xed values. While measuring execution time directly
avoids the imprecision of indirect measurements like memory-access traces, this can
also be considered a source of false negatives, since timing observed in a given test
environment can vary signicantly from other platforms and system loads.
Other statistical approaches measure traces of memory and control-ow operations.
data [42] detects dierences among traces of executions with random inputs, before
honing in on statistical tests with xed- versus random-secret inputs; the approach
relies on expert interaction for classication of potential leaks, and is susceptible to false
positives due to program nondeterminism, e.g., of memory allocators. MicroWalk [43]
proposes alternative statistical tests based on mutual information analysis.
Two-Safety To the best of our knowledge, mutaflow [23] is the only other concrete-
analysis approach considering secure information ow as a two-safety property. Like
our work, mutaflow compares observations along two executions in which the second
receives the rst’s inputs randomly mutated. However, since only program values are
observed, mutaflow cannot detect leakage due to side-channels like timing.
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9 Conclusion and Future Work
This work demonstrates that testing-based software analysis methodologies can be
eectively extended from safety properties to two-safety properties. While our initial
application has targeted timing leaks in cryptographic implementations, there are
several promising directions for future investigation. Since cryptographic code tends
to follow rather simple straight-line control ow, coverage-guided greybox fuzzers
oer relatively little over more simplistic random testing; exposing leaks in more
complex input-processing applications such as jpeg encoders and decoders [45] could
better exploit two-safety-property fuzzers. Furthermore, ct-fuzz could be applied to
other types of leakage, and even other classes of two-safety properties, by extending
the instrumentation mechanism; in principle, our approach is capable of exposing
violations to any two-safety property expressed as equality between program traces.
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